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Preemption is the constitutional doctrine which holds that when 
federal law and state law conflict, federal law must be followed, 
and state law must yield.  In Alaska, the wildlife law known as the 
Intensive Management statute is in conflict with federal laws 
governing national park lands and the management of wildlife on 
those lands.  Preemption requires the State of Alaska to refrain 
from implementing the Intensive Management statute on national 
park lands because of the conflict with federal laws.  This Article 
describes the relevant state and federal laws, the preemption 
doctrine, and the doctrine’s application to wildlife management 
in Alaska.  It concludes by stating that Alaska has every right to 
manage wildlife as it sees fit but must always yield in cases where 
its laws are preempted by the laws of the United States. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since 1994, the State of Alaska has been managing wildlife in 
accordance with the state’s Intensive Management principles laid 
out in the Alaska Code.1  This statute—which will be referred to as 
the Intensive Management statute—directly conflicts with the 
wildlife management mandates laid out by Congress in the 
National Park Service Organic Act2 and the Alaska National 
Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA).3  This direct conflict 
is currently preventing the National Park Service (NPS) from 
achieving the goals set out for it by Congress.4  As the State’s 
implementation of the Intensive Management statute becomes 
increasingly widespread, it is ever more important for the National 
Park Service to recognize that the State’s current Intensive 
Management program is preempted on NPS lands based on a 
theory of direct conflict.  The stark differences in the animating 
legislation of the State and the NPS have led to misunderstandings 
between both the hunting and conservation communities and the 
management agencies themselves.  This Article seeks to explain 
why the NPS may not acquiesce to wildlife management practices 
 
 1. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255 (2006). 
 2. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
 3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3233 (2000). 
 4. Currently, the Intensive Management statute only directly affects national 
preserve lands, since state hunting regulations have been superseded by ANILCA 
§§ 816(a) and 1314(c) since 1989.  For many years the State has informed the 
public that the State’s regulations do not apply to national parks and national 
monuments.  See ALASKA DEPT. OF FISH & GAME, 2007–2008 ALASKA HUNTING 
REGULATIONS 80–88 (2007), available at http://www.wildlife.alaska.gov/ 
regulations/pdfs/regulations_complete.pdf [hereinafter 2007–2008 ALASKA 
HUNTING REGULATIONS]; see also 36 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1983) (prohibiting hunting of 
wildlife or fishing except as otherwise provided in the chapter).  This, however, 
could easily affect all NPS lands because the Federal Subsistence Board, which 
establishes the hunting regulations for parks and monuments, is pressured to 
adopt the State’s hunting regulations, and because the State hopes to eventually 
reclaim control of all hunting in Alaska.  See generally Master Memorandum of 
Understanding Between the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Juneau, 
Alaska, and the U.S. National Park Service, Department of the Interior, 
Anchorage, Alaska (Oct. 14, 1982) [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding] 
(on file with author); see also Letter from Governor Frank Murkowski to 
Secretary Gale Norton (Jan. 10, 2005) (on file with author) (pressuring the federal 
subsistence board to defer to State hunting regulations). 
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that conflict with its mandate and how the Intensive Management 
statute does, in fact, conflict with that mandate. 
Part II of this article outlines the federal mandates for the 
management of wildlife on NPS lands in Alaska.  Part III describes 
Alaska’s Intensive Management statute and the regulations derived 
from it.  Part IV defines the theory of preemption as a result of 
direct conflict, and Part V describes how the criteria for 
preemption of state law, based on a theory of direct conflict, are 
met by the facts in this situation. 
II.  WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AND THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE 
The NPS is guided in its efforts to manage wildlife on its lands 
by its enabling statute, the 1916 National Park Service Organic Act, 
and its most recent interpretation of this statute—which was most 
recently stated in the 2006 Management Policies.  The agency is 
also guided by the legislation creating each park unit—which often 
carries more specific instructions regarding Congress’s intentions 
for the different land areas. 
The Organic Act tells the agency to “conserve the scenery and 
the natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein and to 
provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such 
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future 
generations.”5 Over the years, courts have interpreted this 
somewhat vague statement to mean that the agency has broad 
discretion in making resource use decisions and in determining the 
proper balance between preservation and enjoyment.6  With 
wildlife in particular, the agency initially applied this statutory 
language inconsistently, sometimes emphasizing preservation7 and 
at other times highlighting use and enjoyment.8 
 
 5. 16 U.S.C. § 1. 
 6. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1247 (E.D. Cal. 1999) 
(“[T]he Organic Act does not serve as basis for a cause of action when the issue is 
confined to the Agency’s exercise of discretion in attempting to balance valid, 
competing values.”); see also National Wildlife Federation v. NPS, 669 F. Supp. 
384, 391 (D. Wyo. 1987) (“[T]he Park Service has broad discretion in determining 
which avenues best achieve the Organic Act’s mandate.”). 
 7. An early directive from the Secretary of the Interior to the first director of 
the National Park Service read:  “[H]unting will not be permitted in any national 
park.”  Nat’l Rifle Assoc. v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903, 905 (D.D.C. 1986). 
 8. In the early years of the Park Service, “the Service’s desire to maintain 
peaceful scenes led it to exterminate animals . . . . Predators such as cougars, 
wolves, coyotes, lynx, bobcats, foxes, badgers, mink, weasels, fishers, otters, and 
martens were unnatural impairments to the natural grandeur that the Service 
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In 1978, Congress amended the NPS’s responsibilities with the 
Redwood National Park Expansion Act,9 which states in part that: 
Congress further reaffirms, declares, and directs that the 
promotion and regulation of the various areas of the National 
Park System . . . shall be consistent with and founded in the 
purpose established by the first section of the Act of August 25, 
1916, to the common benefit of all the people of the United 
States.  The authorization of activities shall be construed and the 
protection, management, and administration of these areas shall 
be conducted in light of the high public value and integrity of the 
National Park System and shall not be exercised in derogation of 
the values and purposes for which these various areas have been 
established, except as may have been or shall be directly and 
specifically provided by Congress.10 
This statement reaffirms and strengthens Congress’s earlier 
pronouncement on the NPS’s duties, because it requires that the 
agency’s actions be consistent with the conservation purpose of the 
parks.11 
In the late 1960s, the NPS also began implementing less 
intrusive techniques for the management of wildlife.  This policy—
which has come to be called natural regulation—“relies on 
ecological processes to determine, or regulate, population 
conditions of native plants and animals to the extent practicable.”12  
Under a natural regulation regime, “[w]ildlife populations are 
allowed to fluctuate without direct human intervention.”13  The 
agency’s policy, by the 1980s, “had evolved to emphasize 
maintenance of natural ecological processes as a means of 
managing native wildlife.  The tradition of nonintervention in 
wildlife dynamics in U.S. national parks is an outgrowth of this 
policy . . . .”14  This approach was formalized in a series of 
Management Policies, with the latest being Management Policies 
2006.15  In this document, NPS managers are told to “adopt park 
 
sought to ‘leave unimpaired.’”  DALE D. GOBLE & ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, 
WILDLIFE LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 1063 (2002). 
 9. 92 Stat. 166 (1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1a–1 (2000)). 
 10. Id. (emphasis added). 
 11. Potter, 628 F. Supp. at 910 (finding that the Redwood National Park 
Expansion Act furthers the purpose of conservation in the Organic Act). 
 12. Michael Soukup, Mary K. Foley, Ronald Hiebert & Dan E. Huff, Wildlife 
Management in U.S. National Parks: Natural Regulation Revisited, 9 ECOLOGICAL 
APPLICATIONS 1 (1999). 
 13. Rolf O. Peterson, Wolf-Moose Interaction on Isle Royale: The End of 
Natural Regulation?, 9 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 10 (1999). 
 14. Id. at 10–11. 
 15. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, 
MANAGEMENT POLICIES 2006 (December 2000), available at 
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resource preservation, development, and use management 
strategies that are intended to maintain the natural population 
fluctuations and processes that influence the dynamics of individual 
plant and animal populations, groups of plants and animal 
populations, and migratory animal populations.”16  Therefore, the 
NPS’s current policy is generally to avoid interfering with 
population dynamics. 
Only under unusual circumstances is the natural regulation 
rule set aside for a more active management approach.  For 
instance, the NPS may remove wildlife from parks where the 
agency determines that such removal is necessary for the 
protection of park resources.17  In general, the Organic Act requires 
a finding of “detriment” before the NPS may destroy park wildlife: 
“The Secretary of the Interior . . . may also provide in his discretion 
for the destruction of such animals and of such plant life as may be 
detrimental to the use of any of said parks, monuments, or 
reservations.”18  There is also an NPS policy that requires “an 
explicit finding of detriment by a park superintendent when a 
controlled harvest program is contemplated, i.e., a program 
designed to kill a percentage of a herd [or population] for no other 
reason than the desire to reduce the size of the herd [or 
population].”19  So, while artificial manipulation of wildlife 
 
http://www.nps.gov/policy/MP2006.pdf [hereinafter MANAGEMENT POLICIES 
2006]. 
 16. Id. at 62 (emphasis added). 
 17. See Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (approving the Park 
Service’s authority to remove deer that the Service determined were harming a 
National Historic Site). 
 18. 16 U.S.C. § 3 (2000). 
 19. Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Babbitt, 952 F. Supp. 1435, 1441 (D. 
Mont. 1996), aff’d mem., 108 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1997); see also 48 F.R. 30252 § 2.2 
(1983) (“In units of the National Park System where hunting and trapping 
activities are not authorized by enabling legislation for a park area, resource 
management for purposes of wildlife use and control is accomplished only 
pursuant to the authority of 16 U.S.C. 3, which authorizes the reduction of animal 
populations determined to be ‘detrimental’ to the use of the area and its statutory 
values.”).  See also MANAGEMENT POLICIES 2006, supra note 15, at 44 (“Whenever 
the Service removes plants or animals, manages plant or animal populations to 
reduce their sizes, or allows others to remove plants or animals for an authorized 
purpose, the Service will seek to ensure that such removals will not cause 
unacceptable impacts to [sic] native resources, natural processes, or other park 
resources.  Whenever the Service identifies a possible need for reducing the size of 
a park plant or animal population, the Service will use scientifically valid resource 
information obtained through consultation with technical experts, literature 
review, inventory, monitoring, or research to evaluate the identified need for 
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populations is permissible, the circumstances under which the NPS 
can take such action are quite narrow, and the NPS must first make 
its case for choosing to do so. 
The NPS has a long history of court-supported preemption of 
state wildlife laws where those laws conflict with the NPS’s mission 
or regulations.20  In New Mexico State Game Commission v. Udall, 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the NPS had the 
authority to remove deer from Carlsbad Caverns National Park for 
research purposes without seeking a permit from the state as 
required under New Mexico state law.21  The court added that if the 
State felt that the law gave too much authority to the NPS, the 
remedy was not with the courts since the law is valid and there was 
no abuse of the discretion it created.22  Similarly, in United States v. 
Moore, the West Virginia Southern District Court, citing New 
Mexico State Game Commission, stated that “the power of the 
United States to regulate and protect wildlife living on the 
federally controlled property cannot be questioned.”23  In that case, 
the court found that the NPS had the authority to prevent the state 
from spraying pesticides to eliminate black flies in the New River 
Gorge National River because the NPS’s regulations prohibited the 
taking of wildlife—including black flies.  A final example can be 
found in United States v. Brown, where the State of Minnesota 
wanted to assert the dominance of state hunting laws on waters 
adjacent to and surrounded by Voyageurs National Park.24  Here, 
the court stated bluntly that “[w]here the State’s laws conflict with 
the . . . regulations of the National Park Service . . . the local laws 
 
population management [and] document it in the appropriate park management 
plan.”). 
 20. “Because the NPS Organic Act does not defer to state wildlife law, the 
Park Service is not constrained by that law.”  ROBERT L. GLICKMAN & GEORGE 
CAMERON COGGINS, MODERN PUBLIC LAND LAW 260 (2001).  See also R. Gerald 
Wright, Wildlife Management in National Parks: Questions in Search of Answers, 9 
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 30, 32 (1999) (“From its beginning, the NPS has 
maintained exclusive jurisdiction over the management of wildlife in parks.  And, 
although legally contested by individual state game departments, court decisions 
have uniformly supported the right of the NPS to own and manage wildlife on its 
lands.”). 
 21. 410 F.2d 1197, 1199 (10th Cir. 1969). 
 22. Id. at 1202. 
 23. 640 F. Supp. 164, 166 (S.D. W. Va. 1986); see also Organized Fishermen of 
Fla. v. Andrus, 488 F. Supp. 1351, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (“[T]here is no question 
that the complete power Congress has over public lands under the Property 
Clause of the Constitution . . . necessarily includes the power to regulate and 
protect the wildlife living there.”). 
 24. 431 F. Supp. 56, 59 (D. Minn. 1976). 
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must recede.”25  It is clear that the NPS has the authority to 
regulate activities in park areas even where these regulations 
conflict with state regulations. 
As stated above, the Organic Act provides important general 
guidelines for park management, but it is the specific park 
establishment acts that provide the details for management.  Since 
the management of wildlife within a park depends on Congress’s 
statements at the time the land was set aside, it is important to 
examine the relevant establishment legislation.  ANILCA created 
or expanded nearly every park in Alaska26 and continues to be 
Congress’s most detailed statement as to the proper management 
of Alaska’s parks.  That Act makes it lawful to take wildlife for 
subsistence purposes from most parks and all preserves in Alaska 
and for sport hunting purposes in preserves.27  ANILCA also 
provides guidelines for situations in which wildlife population 
numbers falter.  The statute makes it clear that in such cases, 
subsistence hunting is to be given priority over sport hunting where 
the two compete for wildlife resources; and where the elimination 
of sport hunting is inadequate, the Federal Subsistence Board28 is to 
decrease even subsistence use of animal resources.29  But, in all of 
these detailed instructions provided by Congress, there is no 
mention of any type of intensive management of wildlife resources 
as a solution to such a situation.  This suggests that Congress 
deliberately excluded intensive management practices from the 
NPS’s arsenal under such circumstances.  ANILCA never 
contemplates the use of intensive wildlife management techniques 
as a means of sustaining the hunting systems.  Instead, the statute 
makes clear that hunting must give way where necessary. 
ANILCA’s wildlife management mandate can be found in 
several sections of the statute and can be summed up as a 
requirement to conserve natural and healthy populations of 
wildlife.  ANILCA states: 
 
 25. Id. at 63; see also Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 541 (1976) (holding 
that the argument that Congress lacks power to administer public lands contrary 
to state law without state consent is “without merit”). 
 26. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3233 (2000). 
 27. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3126(a), 3202(c)(1) (2000). 
 28. “Federal subsistence management falls under the authority of the federal 
subsistence board.  The board [is compromised of] the Alaska regional directors 
of the Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, the Forest Service, the 
Bureau of Land Management, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, as well as the 
chair appointed by the Secretary of the Interior.”  DAVID CASE & DAVID 
VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 302 (2002). 
 29. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3114, 3126(b) (2000). 
01__LURMAN_RABINOWITCH.DOC 12/17/2007  11:27:33 AM 
152 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [24:145 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress that . . . 
consistent with sound management principles, and the 
conservation of healthy populations of fish and wildlife, the 
utilization of the public lands in Alaska is to cause the least 
adverse impact possible on rural residents who depend upon 
subsistence uses of the resources of such lands . . . .30 
ANILCA also provides that: 
Nothing in this title shall be construed as . . . granting any 
property right in any fish or wildlife or other resource of the 
public lands or as permitting the level of subsistence uses of fish 
and wildlife within a conservation system unit to be inconsistent 
with the conservation of healthy populations, and within a 
national park or monument to be inconsistent with the 
conservation of natural and healthy populations, of fish and 
wildlife.31 
This strong statement clearly indicates that hunting—even 
subsistence hunting—must never interfere with the maintenance of 
natural, healthy populations.  Intensive management techniques 
that are designed to artificially inflate prey numbers by removing 
native predators, or by other intrusive and disruptive means, would 
not be consistent with the common understanding of the 
conservation of natural and healthy populations. 
The legislative history of the statute indicates that Congress 
took this requirement very seriously.  The Senate Report on 
ANILCA states: “The committee intends the phrase ‘the 
conservation of healthy populations of fish and wildlife’ to mean 
the maintenance of fish and wildlife resources and their habitats in 
a condition which assures stable and continuing natural populations 
and species mix of plants and animals in relation to their 
ecosystems . . . .”32  The report goes on to state that: 
The Committee recognizes that the management policies and 
legal authorities of the National Park System and the National 
Wildlife Refuge System may require different interpretations 
and application of the ‘healthy population’ concept consistent 
with the management objectives of each system.  Accordingly, 
the Committee recognizes that the policies and legal authorities 
of the managing agencies will determine the nature and degree 
of management programs affecting ecological relationships, 
population dynamics, and manipulation of the components of 
the ecosystem.33 
 
 30. Id. at § 3112(1) (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. at § 3125(1) (emphasis added). 
 32. S. REP. NO. 96-413, at 233 (1979), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5070, 
5177 (emphasis added). 
 33. Id. 
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The Senate Report clearly indicates that Congress not only 
intended the Bureau of Land Management, the Forest Service, the 
Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service to manage 
the wildlife on their lands for healthy populations, but that 
Congress also recognized the NPS’s (and the Fish and Wildlife 
Service’s) more rigorous existing wildlife management mandates as 
the appropriate source for the guidance of agency action.  The 
Department of the Interior took this explanation to heart and 
incorporated it, nearly verbatim, into its regulations interpreting 
and implementing the “conservation of healthy populations of fish 
and wildlife” language of ANILCA for purposes of subsistence.34 
Of course, both the Organic Act and ANILCA encourage the 
NPS to cooperate with state and local agencies,35 but such 
cooperation does not authorize variance from statutory directives; 
ANILCA is explicit on this point.  Section 802(3) of ANILCA 
states: 
[E]xcept as otherwise provided by this Act or other Federal laws, 
Federal land managing agencies, in managing subsistence 
activities on the public lands and in protecting the continued 
viability of wild renewable resources in Alaska, shall cooperate 
with adjacent landowners and land managers, including Native 
Corporations, appropriate State and Federal agencies, and other 
nations.36 
Congress did not authorize the NPS to cooperate with state law to 
the point of sacrificing the mandates expressed in ANILCA itself.37 
 
 34. 50 C.F.R. § 100.4 (1992) (“Conservation of healthy populations of fish and 
wildlife means the maintenance of fish and wildlife resources and their habitats in 
a condition that assures stable and continuing natural populations and species mix 
of plants and animals in relation to their ecosystem . . . and recognizes that the 
policies and legal authorities of the managing agencies will determine the nature 
and degree of management programs affecting ecological relationships, 
population dynamics, and the manipulation of the components of the ecosystem.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 35. See 16 U.S.C. § 1a-6(c) (2000) (“The Secretary of the Interior is hereby 
authorized to . . . cooperate, within the National Park System, with any State or 
political subdivision thereof in the enforcement of supervision of the laws or 
ordinances of that State or subdivision.”).  Here again, the Secretary is authorized, 
but not required, to cooperate; such cooperation would not justify a violation of 
the precepts of the statute itself.  See also 16 U.S.C. § 3112(3). 
 36. 16 U.S.C. § 3112(3). 
 37. “The NPS and the states should work as harmoniously as possible, 
particularly in a park where Congress has authorized hunting under state law.  
However, the NPS need not feign that it possesses no authority or responsibility 
over the wild animals within park boundaries.”  Frank Buono, Managing Wildlife 
in the Parks:  The Legal Basis, 14 THE GEORGE WRIGHT FORUM 18, 23 (1997). 
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Finally, ANILCA contains a savings clause preserving state 
authority over wildlife management: “Nothing in this Act is 
intended to enlarge or diminish the responsibility and authority of 
the State of Alaska for management of fish and wildlife on the 
public lands except as may be provided in Title VIII of this Act, or 
to amend the Alaska constitution.”38  But while state authority in 
general is unchanged, the clause itself notes that Title VIII of the 
statute, which creates the federal subsistence priority and lays out 
the management mandate described above, takes precedence.  
Lending too much weight to the preservation of authority portion 
of this clause would nullify the management mandates provided 
elsewhere in the statute, as well as the rest of the language of the 
savings clause itself.  It seems, therefore, that what the savings 
clause is actually preserving to the State is its pre-existing role—
also preserved under the Organic Act—to generally manage 
wildlife.  The Organic Act authorizes the NPS to manage park 
areas, and where that management conflicts with state law, state 
law must give way. 
III.  STATE INTENSIVE MANAGEMENT OF WILDLIFE 
In 1994, the Alaska State Legislature amended the existing 
statute directing the State Board of Game on wildlife 
management.39  The amended statute calls for “intensive 
management” of wildlife populations in place of the earlier 
approach to wildlife management.40  The explicit goal of the State’s 
Intensive Management statute is to maintain, restore, or increase 
the abundance of big game prey populations for human 
consumptive use.41  Where current prey population levels are not 
 
 38. 16 U.S.C. § 3202 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 39. Act of Apr. 12, 1994, ch. 13, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws § 2. 
 40. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255 (2006). 
 41. Section 16.05.255(e) reads as follows: 
The Board of Game shall adopt regulations to provide for intensive 
management programs to restore the abundance or productivity of 
identified big game prey populations as necessary to achieve human 
consumptive use goals of the board in an area where the board has 
determined that 
(1) consumptive use of the big game prey population is a preferred 
use; 
(2) depletion of the big game prey population or reduction of the 
productivity of the big game prey population has occurred and may 
result in a significant reduction in the allowable human harvest of 
the population; and 
(3) enhancement of abundance or productivity of the big game prey 
population is feasibly achievable utilizing recognized and prudent 
active management techniques. 
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considered to be high enough to meet human consumptive needs, 
the State may not respond by curbing harvest levels or taking other 
conservation measures unless intensive management practices are 
simultaneously implemented.42 
The statutory definition of “intensive management” is: 
[M]anagement of an identified big game prey population 
consistent with sustained yield through active management 
measures to enhance, extend, and develop the population to 
maintain high levels or provide for higher levels of human 
harvest, including control of predation and prescribed or 
planned use of fire and other habitat improvement techniques.43 
There can be no doubt that this definition, and the statutory goals 
in general, are likely to lead to high levels of human intervention in 
order to achieve a high level of consistent human consumptive use.  
After all, “intensive management” is intended to maintain a 
“sustained yield,” which the statute itself defines as “the 
achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of the ability to 
support a high level of human harvest of game, subject to 
preferences among beneficial uses, on an annual or periodic 
basis.”44 
Furthermore, under the regulations that implement this 
statute, the State uses the level of hunter demand for big game prey 
as one of the four criteria to be used when “identifying big game 
prey populations that are important for providing high levels of 
human consumptive use.”45  In order to implement the Intensive 
Management statute, the State has crafted regulations that require 
the Board of Game to “utilize active management of habitat and 
predation as the major tools to reverse any significant reduction in 
 
 42. Section 16.05.255(f) reads as follows: 
The Board of Game may not significantly reduce the taking of an 
identified big game prey population by adopting regulations relating to 
restrictions on harvest or access to the population, or to management of 
the population by customary adjustments in seasons, bag limits, open and 
closed areas, methods and means, or by other customary means 
authorized under (a) of this section, unless the board has adopted 
regulations, or has scheduled for adoption at the next regularly 
scheduled meeting of the board regulations, that provide for intensive 
management to increase the take of the population for human harvest 
consistent with (e) of this section. 
This rule may not apply if the Board of Game determines that intensive 
management would be ineffective, inappropriate, or against the best interest of 
subsistence users.  ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255(f) (2006). 
 43. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255(j)(4) (2006). 
 44. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255(j)(5) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 45. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.106(1)(D) (1998). 
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the allowable human harvest of the population.”46 The 
implementing regulations continue to underscore the human-
centered, utilitarian goals of the statute and the high degree of 
manipulation of wildlife systems that is required in order to achieve 
those wildlife management goals. 
If a hunting quota cannot be met in a game management area, 
then intensive management methods must be put into place.47  
Predator control is the most easily identified method of intensive 
management, though it is generally not permitted on NPS or U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service lands.48 Practicing “intensive 
management” does not just consist of predator control, although 
this is the utmost manifestation of the principle. Intensive 
management in practice also includes actions such as:  increasing 
bag limits and liberalizing hunting seasons for predators to increase 
their harvest; eliminating the need for hunters to obtain or 
purchase hunting tags or permits for predators, thereby permitting 
the “incidental” taking of these animals; authorizing same day 
airborne hunting and trapping, which allow takings the same day 
one flies in an aircraft; allowing easier and greater use of motor 
vehicles while hunting, thus increasing the hunter’s advantage; 
expanding the allowable means and methods of hunting for 
predators, like baiting or feeding, thereby creating additional 
opportunities for taking; allowing the sale of raw hides and skulls, 
thereby creating economic incentives for taking; and many others.49 
 
 46. Id. at § 92.106(6) (emphasis added). 
 47. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255(e) (2006). 
 48. See, e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, §§ 92.110, 92.115, 92.125 (2006); see 
also MANAGEMENT POLICIES 2006, supra note 15, at 69 (“The Service does not 
engage in activities to reduce the numbers of native species for the purpose of 
increasing the numbers of harvested species (i.e., predator control), nor does the 
Service permit others to do so on lands managed by the National Park Service.”). 
 49. For example, Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Summary of Actions, 
Proposals No. 147, 148, and 223, passed February/March 2004, reauthorized  the 
brown bear tag fee exemption in Units 19D, 20D, and 20E, because “moose are 
currently below their population or harvest objectives” and “tag fee exemptions 
will encourage harvesting opportunistically associated with other hunting 
practices.”  ALASKA DEPT. OF FISH AND GAME, Summary of Actions 24, 38 (Feb. 
26 – Mar. 10, 2004), available at http://www.boards.adfg.state.ak.us/gameinfo/ 
meetsum/2003_2004/g031004.pdf. [hereinafter Summary of Actions Feb./Mar. 
2004].  Proposal No. 230, passed February/March 2004, increased the wolf hunting 
season and bag limit in Unit 19 because this was “vital in reducing the predator 
population and helping to conserve the moose population.”  Id. at 40.  Proposal 
No. 34, passed November 2005, lengthened the brown bear season in Unit 22A 
because “bear predation . . . is contributing to a serious decline in moose 
population.”  ALASKA DEPT. OF FISH AND GAME, Summary of Actions 9 (Nov. 11 
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Such yearly changes to hunting regulations apply to all hunters 
within the game management unit (or sometimes statewide) on all 
state, private, or (most) federal land, unless a specific exception is 
written into the regulations.50  These regulatory changes are not 
considered predator control activities—which may only be 
executed by those specifically permitted to do predator control.  
Also, the Intensive Management statute does not just affect Alaska 
Board of Game decisions once populations are in decline; rather, it 
is the state’s wildlife management mandate in the same way that 
sections 802 and 815 of ANILCA51 and section 1 of the Organic 
Act52 form the management mandate for the NPS in Alaska.  All 
state wildlife management activities carried out by the Board of 
Game must be driven by the goals and directives of the Intensive 
Management statute or the Board risks violating its legislatively 
prescribed responsibilities. 
Furthermore, intensive management is really an umbrella term 
that describes several different types of management activities.  
Within this category are those management actions already 
 
– 14, 2005), available at http://www.boards.adfg.state.ak.us/gameinfo/meetsum/ 
2005_2006/summ112005.pdf. [hereinafter Summary of Actions Nov. 2005].  
Proposal No. 21, passed January 2006, allowed the trapping of black bear and the 
sale of hides and skulls.  “Board members felt that allowing the sale of hides 
provides an opportunity to increase harvest in predator control areas.”  ALASKA 
DEPT. OF FISH AND GAME, Summary of Actions 4 (Jan. 27 – 29, 2006), available at 
http://www.boards.adfg.state.ak.us/gameinfo/meetsum/2005_2006/jan06-bog-
statewide.pdf. [hereinafter Summary of Actions Jan. 2006].  Proposal No. 29, 
passed March 2006, eliminated brown bear tag fees in Unit 25C. “Adopting this 
proposal is consistent with the intensive management goals for the Fortymile 
caribou herd.  Eliminating bear tag fees is another way of encouraging more 
brown bear harvest.”  ALASKA DEPT. OF FISH AND GAME, Summary of Actions 5 
(Mar. 10 – 21, 2006 ), available at http://www.boards.adfg.state.ak.us/gameinfo/ 
meetsum/2005_2006/bog-march10sac.pdf. [hereinafter Summary of Actions Mar. 
2006]. 
 50. For instance, Proposal No. 6, passed November 2003, authorized the use of 
“snowmachines” to take wolves in Unit 18, but the “board noted that this 
regulation would not apply on federal [wildlife] refuge land.”  ALASKA DEPT. OF 
FISH AND GAME, Summary of Actions 2 (Nov. 1 – 4, 2003), available at 
http://www.boards.adfg.state.ak.us/gameinfo/meetsum/2003_2004/g110403.pdf. 
[hereinafter Summary of Actions Nov. 2003].  State hunting rules do not 
necessarily apply to subsistence hunters on federal lands in Alaska, unless the 
federal subsistence board specifically adopts them because the federal government 
controls all subsistence hunting on federal lands in Alaska.  See generally DAVID 
CASE and DAVID VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS, ch. 8 (2002). 
 51. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3112, 3125 (2000). 
 52. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
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described that are taken within official Intensive Management 
Areas under the Intensive Management statute.  But there are 
identical types of actions taken on lands that are not officially 
designated as Intensive Management Areas or actions intended to 
promote prey species that are not officially recognized by the 
Intensive Management statute.53  While these management 
practices are not a direct result of the Intensive Management 
statute, they are nonetheless an intensive type of wildlife 
management designed to increase selected prey populations for the 
benefit of human hunters and to the detriment of natural 
ecosystem dynamics. 
IV.  PREEMPTION:  WHAT IS IT? 
“When Congress exercises a granted power, concurrent 
conflicting state legislation may be challenged via the Preemption 
Doctrine.”54  In other words, state law must yield where it conflicts 
with federal law.  The concept of preemption is derived from the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,55 which requires that state 
 
 53. Proposal No. 51, passed March 2003, authorized an exemption for brown 
bear tag fees in Unit 11 (which is not an Intensive Management Area within the 
meaning of the Intensive Management statute).  “The board recognized that the 
tag fee exemptions were instituted to stimulate harvest [of brown bear] in 
intensive management areas.”  ALASKA DEPT. OF FISH AND GAME, Summary of 
Actions 8 (Mar. 7 – 15, 2003), available at http://www.boards.adfg.state.ak.us/ 
gameinfo/meetsum/2002_2003/g031503.pdf. [hereinafter Summary of Actions Mar. 
2003].  Proposal No. 56, passed in March 2003, increased the bag limit and season 
length for red fox in certain units.  “The board understood this limited increase 
could benefit those wanting to c[u]ll foxes . . . .”  Id. (species which foxes prey 
upon not targeted by the Intensive Management statute).  Proposal No. 156, 
passed March 2003, increased the hunting season and bag limits for coyote in 
many units in part because the “board recognized the pressure on [Dall’s] sheep 
and small game populations” due to coyote predation.  Id. at 22. (Dall’s sheep are 
not targeted by the Intensive Management statute).  Proposal No. 20, passed 
November 2003, increased the bag limit on wolves in Unit 23 (which is not an 
Intensive Management Area within the meaning of the Intensive Management 
statute) to twenty wolves per season.  “The board determined an increased bag 
limit would benefit moose populations . . . .”  Summary of Actions Nov. 2003, 
supra note 50, at 5. 
 54. JOHN E. NOWAK, RONALD D. ROTUNDA, & J. NELSON YOUNG, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 267 (1978). 
 55. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
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laws that “interfere with, or are contrary to,” federal law be 
invalidated.56 
Laws such as the Organic Act and ANILCA are passed by 
Congress under the granted constitutional power of the Property 
Clause.57 The landmark United States Supreme Court case 
describing the federal government’s powers under the Property 
Clause, specifically as they relate to wildlife, is Kleppe v. New 
Mexico.58  The Kleppe Court stated that “we have repeatedly 
observed that the power over public land thus entrusted to 
Congress is without limitations.”59  The Court ultimately found that 
“the complete power that Congress has over public lands 
necessarily includes the power to regulate and protect wildlife 
living there.”60  Therefore, according to the Court, Congress retains 
the power to enact legislation respecting federal lands pursuant to 
the Property Clause, and when Congress does enact such 
legislation, it “necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the 
Supremacy Clause.”61 
Preemption has been clearly recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court: 
If Congress evidences intent to occupy a given field, any state 
law falling within that field is pre-empted.  If Congress has not 
entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in question, 
state law is still pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with 
federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both 
state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an 
 
 56. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 851 (9th Cir. 2002).  See also 
North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 318 (1983) (stating that state statutes 
that are “plainly hostile to the interests of the United States” need not be 
applied); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824) (holding that “to such acts of 
the State Legislatures as do not transcend their powers, but . . . interfere with, or 
are contrary to the law of Congress, made in pursuance of the Constitution. . . . 
[i]n every such case, the act of Congress . . . is supreme; and the law of the State, 
though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.”).  See 
also NOWAK, ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 54, at 267 (“The supremacy 
clause mandates that federal law overrides, i.e., preempts any state regulation 
where there is an actual conflict between the two sets of legislation such that both 
cannot stand . . . .”). 
 57. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“Congress shall have Power to dispose of 
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States.”). 
 58. 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
 59. Id. at 539 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. San 
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940)). 
 60. Id. at 540–41 (internal quotations omitted). 
 61. Id. at 543. 
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obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.62 
Thus, a state statute may be preempted either because 
congressional legislation completely occupies a given field so that 
there is no room for state action, or because, although Congress 
left room for the state to legislate, the state’s legislation directly 
conflicts with the federal statute. 
In the case of park wildlife management, Congress has not 
expressly preempted state law.  There is no clause in ANILCA or 
the Organic Act that explicitly asserts that state law no longer 
applies in the area of wildlife management.  In fact, to the contrary, 
these statutes are explicit that where there is no conflict, state law 
regarding wildlife management is to remain in effect or is at least to 
be given serious consideration.63  For these reasons it can also be 
said that Congress did not intend for the statutes to completely 
occupy the field of wildlife management.64  There is clearly room 
created by Congress under these statutes for the states to continue 
to legislate. 
Here, Alaska state law and federal law directly conflict with 
each other; in this scenario, state law must yield to the federal law.  
“State action must give way to federal legislation where a valid act 
of Congress fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of 
the state.  Regulations duly promulgated by a federal agency, 
pursuant to Congressional delegation, have the same preemptive 
 
 62. Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 581 (1987) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted) (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee 
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)) (holding that state mining permit requirement 
was not preempted because the federal land use and state environmental 
regulations in question were distinguishable).  See also Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. 
Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 851 (9th Cir. 2002) (“First, Congress may expressly preempt 
state law.  Second, preemption may be inferred where Congress has occupied a 
given field with comprehensive regulation.  Third, a state law is preempted to the 
extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.”); Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954, 
958 (Alaska 1995) (“Federal law can preempt state law in three ways.  First, 
Congress may expressly declare that state law is preempted.  Second, state law is 
preempted if Congress intends the federal government to occupy a field 
exclusively.  Third, federal law preempts state law if the two actually conflict.”). 
 63. See 16 U.S.C. § 1a-6(c)(2) (2000); 16 U.S.C. § 539b(c) (2000); see also 36 
C.F.R. § 13.40 (1983) (adopting non-conflicting state laws into National Park 
Service regulations). 
 64. See Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 959 (“Even though Title VIII [of ANILCA] has 
been fully implemented, it does not create a scheme of federal regulation so 
pervasive that there is no room for state regulation to supplement it.”). 
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effect.”65  Therefore, if a statute passed by Congress is based on 
legitimate constitutional authority, like the Property Clause, then 
the derivative agency regulations interpreting that statute may also 
preempt conflicting state law.66 
Also, state and federal laws need not be contradictory on their 
face for federal law to supersede state law; on the contrary, actual 
conflict may be far more subtle.67  Direct conflict can be found 
where, for instance, the result of a state law is to manifestly 
discourage the very conduct that federal law was meant to 
encourage or if the state law encourages conduct that is 
detrimental to the implementation of federal law.68 
As shall be seen, it is physically impossible to meet the goals of 
both the federal and Alaska state statutes simultaneously;69 
furthermore, the state statute operates as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of Congress’s objectives70 as prescribed in 
ANILCA and other statutes.  For these reasons, which the next 
Part will explain more fully, it is clear that the State’s Intensive 
Management statute, as well as other intensive management 
 
 65. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-26, at 482 (2d 
ed. 1988) (internal quotations omitted). 
 66. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 
713, 714 (1985) (stating that “state laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations 
as well as by federal statutes,” but holding that local ordinances were not 
preempted when there was no evidence that federal regulations explicitly or 
implicitly intended to preempt local regulations in the field of plasma donation). 
 67. TRIBE, supra note 65, at 482. 
 68. See generally TRIBE, supra note 65, at 482–86.  See also Nash v. Fla. 
Industrial Comm’n, 389 U.S. 235, 239–40 (1967) (holding that state unemployment 
compensation laws were preempted because they tended to defeat the objectives 
of the NLRB); Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, Tex., 459 U.S. 145, 153–54 (1982) 
(striking down a state tax because it would penalize the acts a federal law meant to 
encourage); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 
(1973) (holding a city ordinance to be preempted because it mandated restrictions 
that interfered with the accomplishment of the objectives of the Federal 
Aeronautics Act). 
 69. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 851–52 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“Such a conflict arises when compliance with both federal and state regulations is 
a physical impossibility.” (quoting Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713) (internal 
quotations omitted)); see also Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 
572, 581 (1987). 
 70. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (observing that state law is 
preempted where it would stand “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”); see also Cal. Coastal, 
480 U.S. at 581; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).   
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activities not specifically carried out under the Intensive 
Management statute, are preempted on NPS lands. 
V.  PREEMPTION - WHY DOES IT APPLY? 
The State of Alaska is pursuing a course of action that directly 
interferes with the successful execution of congressional mandates 
for the management of wildlife on NPS lands.  It is not surprising 
that conflict should arise between the State and the NPS over the 
State’s game management activities.  This is generally considered a 
likely point of contention.71  NPS policy seeks to sustain and protect 
natural populations and processes while avoiding artificial 
manipulation that increases the numbers of certain species above 
natural levels.72  The Alaska Board of Game, like most state game 
authorities,73 is charged with maintaining high, continuously 
predictable numbers of prey populations, 74 rather than with 
maintaining the naturally fluctuating populations and processes 
that the NPS is charged with protecting.  This significant difference 
in management goals was even recognized by the State of Alaska 
and preserved in the Master Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Alaska Department of Fish and Game and the NPS.75  
That document states that the Department of Fish and Game 
agrees, among other things: 
1. To recognize the Service’s responsibility to conserve fish and 
wildlife and their habitat and regulate the human use on Service 
lands in Alaska, in accordance with the National Park Service 
Organic Act, ANILCA, and other applicable laws. 
2. To manage fish and resident wildlife populations in their natural 
species diversity on Service lands, recognizing that 
nonconsumptive use and appreciation by the visiting public is a 
primary factor.  
. . .  
 
 71. See Buono, supra note 37, at 22 (1997); William F. Porter & H. Brian 
Underwood, Of Elephants and Blind Men: Deer Management in the U.S. National 
Parks, 9 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 3, 5 (1999); supra note 20, at 32. 
 72. See MANAGEMENT POLICIES 2006, supra note 15, at 62. 
 73. See generally Porter & Underwood, supra note 71, at 5 (“States are 
charged with managing population size rather than population process.”); Wright, 
supra note 20, at 32 (“State wildlife agencies typically manage for population size 
and quality (e.g., large trophy males), whereas the NPS has no overt management 
emphasis other than assuring that populations are free of unwarranted unnatural 
disturbances.”). 
 74. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255(e) (2006). 
 75. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 4. 
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5. To recognize that National Park Service areas were established, 
in part, to “assure continuation of the natural process of 
biological succession” and “to maintain the environmental 
integrity of the natural features found in them.”76 
Conserving natural and healthy populations is requisite to 
conserving wild species in their natural diversity to ensure natural 
biological succession.77  There can be no doubt that this was 
Congress’s mandate for the NPS lands.  However, this management 
approach directly conflicts with the State’s actions and so ought to 
preempt them. 
Over time, the preemption cases “have continually narrowed 
the scope of judicial inquiry to a determination of whether, under 
the particular facts of the case, the existence of the state regulatory 
scheme is facilitative or detrimental to the purposes and objectives 
of the federal statute.”78  In other words, there is no hard and fast 
rule as to whether a state statute must be preempted, but rather the 
decision will depend upon the facts of the individual case. 
The Intensive Management statute on its face conflicts with 
federal laws that specifically promote conservation of natural 
processes and natural and healthy populations. ANILCA 
specifically provides permission for wildlife to be removed from 
NPS lands through subsistence and sport hunting.79  While hunting 
is permitted in some parks, it has never been implied that hunting 
should trump the central purpose of the NPS, which is conservation 
in a natural state.80  In fact, the opposite is true.  ANILCA 
 
 76. Id. (emphasis added).  Furthermore, both parties mutually agreed: 
4. To recognize that the taking of fish and wildlife by hunting, 
trapping, or fishing on certain [Park] Service lands in Alaska is 
authorized in accordance with applicable State and Federal law 
unless State regulations are found to be incompatible with 
documented Park or Preserve goals, objectives or management 
plans. 
5. To recognize for maintenance, rehabilitation, and enhancement 
purposes, that under extraordinary circumstances the 
manipulation of habitat or animal populations may be an 
important tool of fish and wildlife management to be used 
cooperatively on Service lands and waters in Alaska by the 
Service or the Department when judged by the Service, on a case 
by case basis, to be consistent with applicable law and Park Service 
policy.” 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 77. See generally M. BEGON, ET AL., ECOLOGY:  INDIVIDUALS, POPULATIONS 
AND COMMUNITIES (1990). 
 78. NOWAK, ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 54, at 269. 
 79. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3126(a), 3202(c)(1) (2000). 
 80. See 16 U.S.C. § 410hh (2000) (establishing that subsistence activities are 
“permitted” in certain park areas, but are not a purpose of those areas). 
01__LURMAN_RABINOWITCH.DOC 12/17/2007  11:27:33 AM 
164 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [24:145 
specifically includes a mechanism through which all hunting, 
including subsistence hunting, may be reduced or eliminated to 
protect wildlife populations,81 but there is no corresponding 
mechanism to artificially inflate prey numbers in order to protect 
hunting, subsistence or otherwise.  Subsistence hunting, for rural 
Alaska residents in particular, must be accommodated, 82 but even 
that must give way where animal population numbers cannot 
support it.  The only solution to such a situation found in the 
statute is to stop or reduce the hunt, not to intensively manage the 
wildlife.83  Hunting, even subsistence hunting, may not be the driver 
for wildlife management within the park system.  Neither the NPS 
nor a state has the authority to undermine the wildlife management 
mandate for the parks determined by Congress.  NPS wildlife may 
only be managed for natural and healthy populations,84 not to 
“achieve human consumptive use goals.” 85 
In addition to this facial conflict between the statutes, the state 
statute conflicts with the federal law as it is applied.  As was 
pointed out in Part III of this Article, Alaska’s Intensive 
Management statute not only countenances but requires significant 
alterations to natural population dynamics, often by facilitating the 
elimination of large numbers of the predator species.  The hunting 
regulations that make this possible are applied throughout the 
game management unit to which they are attached.  For instance, 
Proposals No. 148 and 223, which were passed during the 
February/March 2004 Board of Game meeting, and which 
reauthorized the brown bear tag fee exemption in units 19D and 
20E,86 necessarily affected parts of Yukon-Charley Rivers National 
Preserve and Denali National Preserve, as well as other federal 
lands that happen to be in those units.87  Similarly, Proposal No. 19, 
which was passed in November 2003, and which eliminated the 
 
 81. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3114, 3126(b) (2000). 
 82. See 16 U.S.C. § 3113 (2000). 
 83. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3114, 3126 (2000); see also Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Potter, 628 
F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1986).  In National Rifle Ass’n v. Potter, the court stated that 
“the primary management function with respect to Park wildlife is its preservation 
unless Congress has declared otherwise.”  Id. at 912.  In addition, Secretary 
Hubert Work emphasized that “the duty imposed upon the National Park Service 
in the organic act creating it to faithfully preserve the parks and monuments for 
posterity in essentially their natural state is paramount to every other activity.”  Id. 
at 910 (emphasis added). 
 84. See 16 U.S.C. § 3125 (2000). 
 85. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255(e) (2006). 
 86. Summary of Actions Feb./Mar. 2004, supra note 49, at 24, 38. 
 87. 2007–2008 ALASKA HUNTING REGULATIONS, supra note 4, at 80–88. 
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resident tag fee for brown bear in unit 23,88 affected Gates of the 
Arctic National Preserve and Noatak National Preserve.89  Proposal 
No. 120, which was passed in March 2006, extended the wolf 
hunting season for units 12, 20, and 25, in order to “help increase 
moose numbers.”90 This regulation affects Denali National 
Preserve, Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve, and Wrangell-
St. Elias National Preserve.91 
Wildlife managers cannot strive to maximize prey for human 
consumption while simultaneously conserving natural and healthy 
populations of all species.  The two goals and the means by which 
they are achievable are mutually exclusive.  The goals and methods 
of the Intensive Management statute have manifested themselves 
in a multitude of actions, described above, which attempt to 
manipulate wildlife, often at the expense of predator populations.  
It is clear that both federal and state entities recognize that outright 
predator control is inappropriate on NPS lands.92  It should now be 
apparent as well that the many actions in addition to actual 
predator control under the Intensive Management statute 
inherently conflict with federal law and should be prohibited from 
being executed on NPS lands.93 
There is a series of United States Supreme Court cases which 
hold that general statutory expressions of national policy are not 
necessarily sufficient to result in statutory conflict leading to 
preemption; rather, specific federal declarations are often 
required.94  In Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, the Court stated 
 
 88. Summary of Actions Nov. 2003, supra note 50, at 5. 
 89. 2007–2008 ALASKA HUNTING REGULATIONS, supra note 4, at 96–98. 
 90. Summary of Actions Mar. 2006, supra note 49, at 18. 
 91. 2007–2008 ALASKA HUNTING REGULATIONS, supra note 4, at 61–62, 83–88, 
102–04. 
 92. See Letter from Marcia Blaszak, Regional Director, National Park Service, 
to Mike Fleagle, Chairman, Alaska Board of Game (Oct. 15, 2004) (on file with 
author) (stating that, in the past, National Park Service lands have been 
specifically excluded by the Alaska Board of Game from predator control areas). 
 93. Letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Fish Wildlife and Parks, 
Department of the Interior, to Gerald Nicholia, Chair, Eastern Interior Alaska 
Subsistence Regional Advisory Council (Dec. 15, 2006) (on file with author) 
(stating that predator control in particular and manipulation of wildlife 
populations in general is “contrary to the National Park Service concept”). 
 94. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 435 U.S. 609, 634 (1981) 
(holding that Montana’s severance tax on coal did not violate the Supremacy 
Clause because general expressions by Congress that the use of coal is favored 
over other fossil fuels are not sufficient to preempt a state law that might burden 
that goal); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. 
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 220–23 (1983) (rejecting the claim that California’s 
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that “it is necessary to look beyond general expressions of ‘national 
policy’ to specific federal statutes with which the state law is 
claimed to conflict.”95  In that case, utility companies sued the State 
of Montana, arguing that the State’s severance tax on coal is 
preempted by several federal statutes which encourage the use of 
coal over other fossil fuels.96  The Court, however, noted that 
Congress specifically provided for the continuation of state 
severance taxes on coal in the savings clauses of the relevant 
statutes, and the legislative history demonstrates that Congress 
contemplated Montana’s severance tax specifically when writing 
those clauses.97 
In Alaska, however, the facts surrounding the management of 
wildlife indicate that the exact opposite is true.  The savings clauses 
in ANILCA explicitly recognize that section VIII of the statute 
changes federal and state roles regarding wildlife management.98  
Also, the legislative history emphasizes Congress’s desire to ensure 
that agencies manage wildlife strictly to maintain healthy and 
natural populations and, furthermore, notes the NPS’s pre-existing 
conservation mission and recognizes that the NPS, and the Fish and 
Wildlife Service in particular, may need to develop more stringent 
wildlife protection regulations.99  In the statutes themselves, and in 
the legislative history, Congress never contemplates the use of 
alternative goals and methods for wildlife management on NPS 
lands, though Congress was likely aware that such alternatives 
were in place in many state systems. 
The case of Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul100 
suggests, however, that differing statutory goals alone may not 
suffice to be the basis for preemption.  In that case, Florida farmers 
sued the State of California over a California statute which limited 
the avocados that could be sold in California to those containing 
less than eight percent oil, even though a federal statute already 
created guidelines for the sale of avocados.101  The Court found that 
preemption did not apply because the California statute did not 
 
moratorium on new nuclear power plants frustrates the Atomic Energy Act’s 
purpose to encourage the commercial use of nuclear power). 
 95. 453 U.S. at 634. 
 96. Id. at 633. 
 97. Id. at 635. 
 98. 16 U.S.C. § 3202 (2000). 
 99. S. REP. NO. 96-413, at 233 (1979), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5070, 
5177. 
 100. 373 U.S. 132 (1963). 
 101. Id. at 133–34. 
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directly conflict with the federal statute.102  The state statute 
adopted oil percentage requirements and the federal statute 
adopted picking date, weight, and size restrictions; therefore the 
requirements of both regulatory schemes could be met 
simultaneously and preemption was not necessary.103  Ultimately, 
the Court said that the “test of whether both federal and state 
regulations may operate, or the state regulation must give way, is 
whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the 
federal superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at 
similar or different objectives.”104  As has already been pointed out, 
the objectives of the statutes in question in this Article are in fact 
“quite dissimilar”105 and the perpetuation of the State’s regime 
must come at the expense of the federal goals.  Here, the goals do 
not simply differ; rather, the State scheme interferes with NPS 
Management, since wildlife populations that are regularly 
manipulated are not natural. 
Human manipulation of wildlife populations may very well 
lead to unnatural or unhealthy conditions for those populations.  
For instance, if predator populations are artificially suppressed to 
increase prey populations, those prey populations can become so 
overabundant that they destroy the very environment upon which 
they depend.106  Of course, a superficial response to this problem is 
 
 102. Id. at 141. 
 103. Id. at 142–43. 
 104. Id. at 142. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See William J. Ripple et al., Trophic Cascades Among Wolves, Elk and 
Aspen on Yellowstone National Park’s Northern Range, 102 BIOLOGICAL 
CONSERVATION 227, 228 (2001) (describing how elk overbrowsing has contributed 
to a great decline in aspen regeneration in Yellowstone National Park and 
suggesting that it was the extirpation of wolves that led to changed elk patterns of 
movement through the park, which led to this situation).  The authors also suggest 
that the reintroduction of wolves to the park may be reversing this process.  Id.  
See also FREDERIC WAGNER ET AL., WILDLIFE POLICIES IN THE U.S. NATIONAL 
PARKS 46–47 (1995) (“Even the most superficial review of animal problems in the 
parks reveals that overpopulations [of ungulates] are at the root of many 
difficulties . . . .  The more complex policy question to resolve once more turns on 
the matter of naturalness.  The ecosystems in parks primarily established for their 
preservation . . . are clearly being altered by the browsing of elevated deer 
populations.”).  Wagner and his co-authors cite “the following generalizations 
about the effects of high deer densities in eastern U.S. deciduous forests:” 
[C]omposition of the forest overstory may be determined by browsing 
out the saplings of palatable tree species and leaving the unpalatable 
species to dominate the forest; the composition of the understory may be 
determined in the same way and, at the extreme, eliminated . . . .  
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simply to argue that hunters will replace predators in this new 
version of an ecosystem and prey numbers will be kept in check.  
However, while hunting may prevent the problems related to 
ungulate overabundance, it can still lead to unnatural conditions.  
Suppressed or absent predator populations, even if nominally 
replaced by humans who cull large ungulates, will still lead to 
altered cascading trophic effects (i.e., changes in what is present to 
eat and be eaten will be felt up and down the food chain).107  An 
oversimplified example of such unnatural consequences may be 
that decreased wolf populations lead to increased coyote 
populations, which lead to decreased fox populations—each 
change causing many other changes in related prey populations 
(e.g., rodents, other small mammals, and birds).108  It is impossible 
to manipulate one end of a trophic system (or ecosystem) without 
causing a chain reaction of other unnatural and often unpredictable 
results. 
The intensive management situation is very similar to First 
Iowa Hydroelectric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission,109 
where a utility cooperative’s application for a license to build a 
dam was blocked by the State of Iowa for failure to comply with 
Iowa law, although the application met all the requirements of the 
Federal Power Act.110  The Court stated that, “[c]ompliance with 
State requirements that are in conflict with federal requirements 
 
Fundamental changes in vegetation alter the abundance and diversity of 
animal species that depend on it. 
Id. (internal quotations omitted); Douglas W. Smith, Rolf Peterson & Douglas B. 
Houston, Yellowstone After Wolves, 53 BIOSCIENCE 330, 331 (2003) (finding that 
once grey wolves were extirpated from Yellowstone National Park in the early 
1930s “some ungulate species, particularly elk, were considered to be 
‘overabundant’ and ‘range deterioration’ became an issue”). 
 107. See GARY K. MEFFE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 392 
(2d ed. 1997) (“Management of single species can lead to maximizing production 
of a few species without regard to the community/ecosystem in which they occur.  
Achieving high densities for one species may cause serious habitat degradation 
and reduce biodiversity.”). 
 108. See generally Smith, Peterson & Houston, supra note 106, at 335–38 
(finding generally that wolf reintroduction to the park has resulted in a fifty 
percent decline in coyote density; because red fox compete closely with coyote 
their numbers may increase; wolverine populations may also increase because 
they rely on scavenging carcasses which are now more abundant due to wolf 
predation; willow and aspen, which had been rare prior to wolf reintroduction, are 
now increasing and are important for many bird and small mammal species, as 
well as beaver and moose). 
 109. 328 U.S. 152 (1946). 
 110. Id. at 156–64. 
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may well block the federal license.”111  Ultimately, the Court found 
that the State’s laws were preempted and stated that: 
The Act leaves to the states their traditional jurisdiction subject 
to the admittedly superior right of the Federal Government, 
through Congress, to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, 
administer the public lands and reservations of the United States 
and, in certain cases, exercise authority under the treaties of the 
United States.  These sources of constitutional authority are all 
applied in the Federal Power Act to the development of the 
navigable waters of the United States.112 
Similarly, the Organic Act and the ANILCA leave to the State of 
Alaska its traditional power to regulate wildlife as long as that 
power is not used in ways that conflict with the federal 
government’s superior right to regulate its lands.  It is important to 
keep in mind that: 
Where Congress has legislated in a field traditionally occupied 
by the states . . . there is a presumption against preemption, and 
a finding of preemption requires a ‘clear and manifest’ 
Congressional purpose . . . .  [F]ederal courts can be expected to 
take a close look to determine whether preemption is consistent 
with what appears to be the Congressional purpose.113 
It is true that wildlife management is an area of law typically 
left to state control, but it is also true that under the Property 
Clause of the Constitution the federal government has the right to 
legislate concerning its land and the wildlife thereon.114  “State 
action incompatible with a legitimate exercise of federal power 
lacks validity, even when within an area where the states might 
otherwise act.”115  Ultimately, if the Property Clause and the 
Supremacy Clause are to be given full effect, federal laws must 
trump state law even in the area of wildlife management.  As the 
 
 111. Id. at 167. 
 112. Id. at 171–72. 
 113. WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE – AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, FEDERAL PREEMPTION: A BRIEF 
ANALYSIS 7 (Aug. 26, 1999). 
 114. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 545 (1976) (“Unquestionably the 
States have broad trustee and police powers over wild animals within their 
jurisdictions.”); see also Fund for Animals v. Thomas, 932 F. Supp. 368, 369–70 
(D.D.C. 1996) (“The common law has always regarded the power to regulate the 
taking of animals ferae naturae to be vested in the states to the extent their 
exercise of that power may not be incompatible with, or restrained by, the rights 
conveyed to the Federal government by the Constitution.” (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
 115. NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, 
UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 50 (2d ed. 1999). 
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Supreme Court said in Hines v. Davidowitz,116 where the state’s law 
stands as “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress,” it must be preempted.117 
This is the case at hand. The goal of the Intensive 
Management statute, to maintain an artificially high level of prey 
animals in order to meet the needs of all hunters in the state, is 
completely incongruous to the goals of the Organic Act and the 
ANILCA, which are to maintain natural and healthy populations 
and processes.  Therefore, regulations enacted by the State which 
directly affect NPS lands, in order to meet or further the goals of 
the Intensive Management statute, are likely to discourage, 
complicate, or thwart the NPS’s ability to meet the goals of the 
Organic Act and the ANILCA. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
It has been clear for some time that NPS regulations may 
preempt state wildlife management laws that conflict with the 
NPS’s own mandates at any time under the Organic Act.  What is 
now also clear is that Alaska’s Intensive Management statute meets 
the criteria for direct conflict with federal law, specifically the 
Organic Act and the ANILCA, as well as derivative regulations 
and policies, and must be preempted in favor of wildlife 
management goals and techniques that are in line with the 
mandates established by Congress. 
While this article may appear to support an enormous shift in 
responsibility among federal and state managers, in fact the 
balance of power remains the same.  Congress never suggested that 
it would tolerate the co-existence of state laws that thwarted its 
own legislative intent.  This is necessarily a fact-specific analysis; 
different state wildlife management regimes might yield very 
different results. 
We do not mean to imply that intensive management practices 
are normatively bad or wrong in some philosophical sense.  The 
State has every right to manage wildlife for abundance of key 
species, and, by doing so, is meeting the needs and desires of many 
residents.  Unfortunately, such management techniques and goals, 
while perfectly legitimate on state and private lands, are neither 
appropriate nor legal on NPS lands, which are required to be 
managed for purposes other than maximized human consumptive 
uses.  Reconciling these two disparate systems is not a matter of 
 
 116. 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
 117. Id. at 67 (emphasis added). 
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determining who is right and who is wrong.118  Instead, it is a matter 
of determining on which lands these practices are allowed by law 
and on which lands they are not. 
 
 118. Porter & Underwood, supra note 71, at 5. 
